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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the relationship between macroeconomic conditions, alcohol use, and
drinking problems using individual-level data from the 1987-1999 years of the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System.  We confirm the procyclical variation in overall drinking identified in previous
research using aggregate sales data and show that this largely results from changes in consumption among
existing drinkers, rather than movements into or out of drinking.  Moreover, the decrease in alcohol use
occurring during bad economic times is concentrated among heavy consumers, with light drinking
actually increasing in these periods.  We find no evidence that the decline in overall drinking masks a rise
in alcohol use for persons becoming unemployed during contractions, suggesting that any stress-induced
increases in consumption are more than offset by reductions resulting from changes in economic factors
such as lower incomes.
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Does Drinking Really Decrease in Bad Times?
Research emphasizing psychological responses to economic downturns suggests that
alcohol use will rise during these periods as a form of self-medication for stress, with particularly
large growth in abusive drinking and risky behaviors such as drunk driving (e.g. Brenner and
Mooney, 1983; Winton, et al, 1986; Pierce, et al., 1994).  However, the causal effects of
macroeconomic conditions are actually more complicated.  A separate psychological literature
emphasizes the role of job stress (e.g. Baker, 1985; Karsek and Theorell, 1990; Sokejima and
Kagamimori, 1998), implying that drinking may increase with the intensity of employment.
1
Previous research also indicates that consumption is positively related to incomes (e.g. Skog,
1986; Sloan et al., 1995, Ruhm 1995).  Thus, stress-induced drinking during depressed periods
might be partially or fully offset by reductions due to decreased earnings.  Conversely, the
opportunity cost of alcohol use might fall if the negative consequences of intoxication during the
work-day are reduced due to declining work hours or increased unemployment.
2  Finally, the
drinking patterns could differ across groups.  For instance, employed individuals might drink less
while alcohol problems increase among the newly unemployed.
3
This paper analyzes the relationship between economic conditions and drinking behavior
using individual-level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).
Several features make this study unique.  First, we consider a wider range of outcomes than in
previous research, including differences in the responsiveness of “light” and “heavy” drinkers.
Second, we provide the first examination of the dynamics of the adjustment of alcohol use to
changes in macroeconomic conditions.  Third, we explore whether the cyclical fluctuations differ
across population subgroups stratified by sex, race/ethnicity, age, and employment status.
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Our investigation confirms the procyclical variation in overall drinking identified in
previous research.  In addition we show that almost all of the fluctuation results from changes in
consumption for existing drinkers, instead of entry or exit into alcohol use.  In fact, decreased
drinking during bad times is dominated by reductions in heavy rather than recreational drinking.
Although the strength of the macroeconomic fluctuations differs across demographic groups, the
patterns of effects appear fairly universal.  Finally, we uncover no evidence that drinking
increases among persons becoming newly unemployed during bad economic times.
1.  Previous Research
There has been considerable research examining how alcohol use is affected by taxes or
prices, minimum legal drinking ages, restrictions on availability, and laws aimed at reducing
drunk-driving.
4  By contrast, macroeconomic conditions have received less attention.  Ruhm
(1995) investigates how these are related to alcohol consumption and highway vehicle fatalities
using aggregate data for the 48 contiguous states over the 1975-1988 time period.  The primary
finding is that drinking and vehicle mortality vary procyclically.
5  One reason is that incomes
grow when the economy expands and alcohol is a normal good.  Freeman (1999) raises concern
that the data used by Ruhm may be non-stationary.  Nevertheless, using an expanded data set
(covering the 50 states and District of Columbia for the 1970-1995 period) that is rendered
stationary by using growth rates instead of levels, he confirms the procyclical variation of
alcohol consumption.
6
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The use of aggregate data in these studies introduces several complications.  First, the set
of covariates controlled for is generally limited.
7  Second, it is difficult to ascertain individual
behavior; this is often referred to as the “ecological inference” problem.  For example, overall
alcohol consumption might fall during recessions because of decreases among recreational users,
even while heavy drinking increases.  Since moderate alcohol use has recently been linked to
health benefits (e.g. Gaziano, et al., 1993; Thun, et al., 1997) and drinking problems are likely to
be concentrated among those imbibing large amounts, reductions in total use could therefore
mask increases in alcohol abuse.
8  Similarly, consumption might decline in bad times because
workers drink less, even while persons becoming newly unemployed raise their intake of
alcohol.  Such a pattern might help to reconcile the psychological literature emphasizing drinking
as self-medication for the stress of unemployment with an overall procyclical pattern of alcohol
use.
9  Potential differences across sex, race/ethnicity, or age groups also can not be identified
using aggregate sales data.
10
These shortcomings indicate that much can be gained by investigating the relationship
between economic conditions and drinking behavior with microdata.  The few previous studies
doing so yield inconclusive results.  Ettner’s (1997) analysis of the 1988 National Health
Interview Survey concludes that alcohol consumption and dependence are procyclical.
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However, the results for involuntary unemployment are mixed (it is associated with more
drinking but less alcohol dependence), indicating potentially nonuniform impacts of the
macroeconomy.  Moreover, Ettner’s use of cross-sectional data implies that the impact of
economic conditions may be confounded with unobserved determinants of drinking that vary
across states.
11
Dee (2001) avoids some of these problems by estimating fixed-effect models using data
from the 1984-1995 years of the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.  He obtains the
contradictory result that increases in state unemployment rates are associated with reductions in
overall drinking and in the probability of consuming 60 or more drinks per month but also with a
higher likelihood of consuming five or more drinks on a single occasion.  Conversely, Ruhm’s
(2000) analysis of BRFSS data for the 1987 to 1995 period suggests a countercyclical variation
in alcohol consumption.   One possible reason for these inconsistent findings is that Dee and
Ruhm include both year and state dummy variables in their models, although doing so removes
most of the sample variation in unemployment.  A second is that neither study weights the data
for differences in sampling probabilities, even though the survey is only nationally representative
after weighting and (as shown below) there are sharp differences in drinking behavior across
demographic groups.  Finally, only a limited set of explanatory variables are included.  For
instance, neither Dee nor Ruhm control for alcohol taxes or prices.
We improve on prior research in several ways.  First, our analysis of the BRFSS data
covers a longer (and more recent) period.  Second, we consider a broader array of outcomes,
paying particular attention to the distinction between recreational drinking and heavy alcohol
use.  Third, we investigate the dynamics of the adjustment to sustained changes in
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macroeconomic conditions.   Fourth, we offer a more complete examination of differences in
drinking behavior on the basis of age, sex, race/ethnicity, and employment status.
12
2.  Data and Methods of Analysis
Data are from the 1987-1999 interview years of the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System.  The BRFSS, administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is an
annual telephone survey of the non-institutionalized adult population designed to produce
uniform state-specific data on preventive health practices and risky behaviors, including alcohol
use and abuse.  One goal of the survey is to enable public health professionals to monitor state
and national progress towards meeting the Healthy People 2000: National Health Promotion and
Disease Prevention Objectives.  Only 15 states participated in the BRFSS in its first year (1984)
but 34 states did so by 1987 and 45 or more in each year of the 1990s.  Sample sizes are large,
exceeding fifty thousand in each year that we analyze, and they increase over time so that our 13-
year sample contains over one million observations.  Information on alcohol use is available for
all respondents except those interviewed in 1994, 1996, and 1998, when these questions were
restricted to optional modules included by 12, 17, and 12 states respectively.
13
The BRFSS, while extremely useful for this analysis, does contain several limitations.
First, since the data are obtained from telephone surveys of residential households, persons
without phones or whose abode is non-residential (e.g. military bases, college dorms, or
institutions) are excluded.  Second, no information is provided on youths (under the age of 18).
Third, alcohol use is likely to be understated in self-reported data.
14  However, this will only bias
the estimates if the underreporting systematically differs with economic conditions.  Fourth, the
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responses must be weighted to make the BRFSS fully representative of the target adult
population.
2.1  Dependent Variables
The BRFSS collects various information on alcohol use.  Respondents are asked whether
they had at least one drink of any alcoholic beverage during the prior month.  Those answering in
the affirmative are questioned about the number of drinks, whether they had more than five
drinks on a single occasion, and if they had driven after having “had perhaps too much to
drink.”
15  Using these data, we created several dependent variables, all referring to alcohol use in
the last month.  “Drinking participation” has a value of one (zero) for persons with some (no)
consumption.  “Conditional drinking” indicates the number of alcoholic beverages imbibed by
drinkers.  “Alcohol-involved driving” is a dummy variable set to one for persons who have
driven when they “had perhaps to much to drink.”  Dummy variables for conditional drinking in
the ranges of 1-10, 1-20, 21-59,  , 60 ≥  and  100 ≥ alcoholic beverages are used to distinguish
between “light,” “moderate,” and “heavy” drinking.  Finally, “binge drinking” is a binary
outcome indicating whether consumers had imbibed five or more beverages on a single occasion.
The distinction between drinking participation and conditional drinking is common in
health applications and is motivated by the assumption that the process distinguishing some
versus no use may be distinct from that generating alternative positive values.
16  In this
formulation, expected consumption for individual i with characteristics X is determined by:
(1)  E[Yi|Xi]   =   Pr[Yi>0|Xi]   x   E[Yi|Yi>0,Xi],
where Y is the number of drinks in the month, E(.) and Pr(.) indicate conditional expectations
and probabilities, and the first (second) term on the right-hand-side of (1) refers to drinking
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participation (conditional drinking).  As is conventional, we assume that the natural log of
conditional drinking is linearly related to the explanatory variables according to:
(2) E[ln(Yi)|Yi>0,Xi]   =   Xiβ ˆ ,
 for β ˆ  the vector of regression coefficients.  We similarly estimate the conditional probabilities
of light, moderate, heavy, or binge drinking after restricting the sample to alcohol users.
A small number of respondents report extremely high (and presumably erroneous) levels
of consumption.  To avoid assigning these outliers undue influence, we top-code conditional
drinking at 450 drinks per month (15 drinks per day).
17  Information on drinking participation is
not reported for 0.2 percent of the sample (2150 individuals), with additional missing values for
the other outcomes.
18  While there does not appear to be a consistent pattern of nonresponse for
conditional drinking, missing values for alcohol-involved driving and binge drinking tend to
concentrated among heavy consumers.
19  However, there is no indication that non-response
biases the parameter estimates for the macroeconomic variables of key interest.
20
2.2  Explanatory Variables
Our main proxy for macroeconomic conditions is the survey month state unemployment
rate for the civilian non-institutionalized population (aged 16 and over).  Data are from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) Database.
21  Some
models include lagged unemployment rates.  Others additionally hold constant average annual
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state per capita personal income (in thousands of $1999), deflated by the all-items consumer
price index.
22
The econometric models also control for a quadratic in years of age and dummy variables
for sex, education (high school dropout, some college, college graduate), race/ethnicity (non-
Hispanic black, other non-Hispanic nonwhite, Hispanic origin), marital status (married,
divorced/separated, widowed), as well as interactions between age, sex, and race/ethnicity.
Information on one or more demographic characteristic is not reported for 0.8 percent of
respondents (8298 persons).  To avoid deleting these individuals from the sample, the relevant
regressors were set to zero and missing value dummy variables were created.
23  Finally, the sum
of the state and federal taxes (in $1999) on a case of beer (24-12 ounce cans or bottles) are held
constant, using data from various issues of the U.S. Brewers’ Association Brewer’s Almanac and
the Federation of Tax Administrators web-site.
24
2.3  Descriptive Information
Table 1 presents sample means for selected variables.  The first column shows averages
for the raw data while the second weights the observations using BRFSS final sampling
weights.
25  Males, young adults, minorities, Hispanics, and currently married individuals are
underrepresented in the raw data.  Since drinking behavior differs substantially across population
groups, analysis of unweighted data may therefore provide unreliable estimates of the average
“treatment effect” and sampling weights are incorporated in most of the econometric analysis.
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Drinking is highly concentrated.  Just over half of adults imbibed any alcohol in the last
month and those doing so averaged around 21 drinks.  Fifty percent of consumers had fewer than
10 drinks, 75 percent less than 25, and only 5 percent imbibed 80 or more alcoholic beverages.
Similarly, fewer than 3 percent of adults claim to have driven after “perhaps having had too
much to drink.”  Moreover, those drinking 25 or more beverages accounted for more than 70
percent of alcohol consumption and those consuming 80 or more beverages were responsible for
almost 30 percent of total drinking.
Figure 1 displays the pattern of average unemployment rates and alcohol consumption
using quarterly data obtained by taking weighted averages over three-month periods and
normalizing by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the standard deviation;  thus, the
figure shows fluctuations in terms of standard deviations from the mean.  Two points are
noteworthy.  First, drinking was at relatively low levels during the bad economic times of the
early 1990s, suggesting that alcohol use is procyclical.  However, since other factors could have
been changing simultaneously, a multivariate analysis is needed to confirm this.
26  Second,
unemployment and alcohol consumption both trended down over the sample period.  The decline
in joblessness resulted from the economic expansion of the middle and late 1990s.  The fall in
drinking reflects a secular trend continuing virtually unabated since 1981, and therefore is
presumably not causally related to reductions in unemployment.
27  This is dealt with in the
empirical analysis by including a vector of state-specific time trends.
2.4  Econometric Methods
The basic econometric specification is:
(3) Yijmt = αj + Xijmtβ + Emjtγ + δm + εijmt ,
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where Y is the alcohol outcome for individual i living in state j interviewed in month m of year t,
X is a vector of covariates (individual characteristics and beer taxes), E the measure of local
economic conditions, ε is a regression disturbance, and α and δ represent unobserved
determinants of alcohol use associated with the state and survey month.
The month-effects control for seasonal variations in alcohol use and the state fixed-effect
holds constant determinants of drinking that differ across locations but are time-invariant.  The
impact of the macroeconomic fluctuations is therefore identified by within-state variations in
economic conditions, relative to changes occurring in other states.  Most of the models also
include a vector of state-specific linear time trends (αj*T), to control for factors that vary over
time within states, implying the regression equation:
(4) Yijmt = αj + Xijmtβ + Emjtγ + δm + αj*T + εijt.
28
For ease of interpretation, the results of linear probability models are usually presented
for the dichotomous outcomes; however, very similar predicted effects are obtained from
corresponding binary probit models.  The Huber-White sandwich estimator is used to calculate
robust standard errors, with observations assumed to be independent across states and calendar
months but not within states in a given month.
29
3.  Drinking Is Procyclical
Table 2 summarizes alternative econometric estimates of the effect of a one percentage
point increase in the state unemployment rate on drinking participation, conditional drinking, and
alcohol-involved driving.
30  The first three columns differ according to whether or not they
include state-specific time trends or weight the data.  These models also control for individual
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characteristics, beer taxes, month dummy variables, and state fixed-effects.  The parameter
estimates for the supplementary regressors are consistent with those found in previous research
(see Appendix Table A.1 for details).
31
The three specifications consistently indicate that drinking participation is insensitive to
macroeconomic conditions, that conditional drinking exhibits a sharp procyclical variation, and
suggest that drunk-driving also becomes less common in bad times.  The model we prefer,
because it includes state-specific trends and sampling weights, and will focus on throughout the
remainder of the paper is shown in column (c).
32  In this case, a one percentage point rise in
unemployment is predicted to reduce drinking participation, conditional drinking, and alcohol-
involved driving by 0.3, 3.1, and 3.3 percent respectively.
33
Model (d) adds a vector of year dummy variables to control for unobserved factors that
vary over time but have uniform effects across locations.  Unfortunately, the year-effects absorb
most of the remaining variation in state unemployment rates, making it difficult to independently
identify the impact of the macroeconomy.
34  Given this, it is no surprise that their inclusion
substantially attenuates the predicted impacts – by almost one-half for alcohol-involved driving
and over two-thirds for conditional drinking.  However, the point estimates continue to suggest a
procyclical variation in alcohol use.
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Binary probit models are used for the two dichotomous outcomes (drinking participation
and alcohol-involved driving) in column (e).  The resulting predicted effects, calculated with the
explanatory variables other than unemployment evaluated at the sample means, are very close to
the corresponding linear probability model estimates, suggesting that little is lost by not
explicitly accounting for the discrete nature of these dependent variables.
The estimates in specification (f) use state-level aggregates, constructed by calculating
average values for each state-year cell from the (weighted) individual BRFSS data.  The alcohol
outcome is then regressed on unemployment rates, beer taxes, state fixed-effects, and state-
specific time trends, with observations weighted by the square root of the adult population in the
state.  Thus, these models approximately correspond to previous research (e.g. Ruhm, 1995;
Freeman, 1999) examining the macroeconomic variation in state alcohol sales or traffic fatalities
with aggregate data.  Our findings once again indicate a procyclical pattern of conditional
drinking and possibly drunk-driving combined with little change in drinking participation,
suggesting that individual and aggregate data yield consistent predictions.
Additional estimates are provided in Table 3.  The first column repeats the results of
model (c) in Table 2.  The next two specifications add controls for the monthly U.S.
unemployment rate (model b) or average survey year per capita incomes in the state (column c).
The coefficients on the national unemployment rate must be interpreted cautiously, since omitted
variables may be spuriously correlated with this measure of macroeconomic conditions.  Noting
this caveat, specification (b) indicates that national downturns are associated with larger
reductions in drinking than corresponding deteriorations in state economic conditions.  A one
percentage point rise in the U.S. unemployment rate is anticipated to decrease conditional
drinking by over 6 percent, drinking participation by 1.6 percentage points (3.1 percent), and
alcohol-involved driving by 0.15 points (5.6 percent); the same rise in state joblessness
(controlling for the national rate) is predicted to reduce conditional drinking by just 1.3 percentPage 13
while having no impact on the other two outcomes.  This raises the possibility that the within-
state variations focused upon in this analysis understate the reduction in alcohol use occurring
during national downturns.
Alcohol consumption falls in bad times partly because of declining incomes.  A $1000
reduction in per capita personal income is predicted to decrease conditional drinking by over five
percent (model c), and controlling for income reduces the unemployment coefficient by around
one-quarter.
35  The $1000 decline is also anticipated to lower alcohol-involved driving by 0.12
percentage points (4.4 percent).  These results accord with evidence presented by Ruhm (1995)
and others that alcohol use and drunk-driving are normal goods.
4.  Light Versus Heavy Drinking
The findings above demonstrate that the macroeconomic variation in drinking is
dominated by changes at the intensive margin (how much drinkers consume) rather than the
extensive margin (whether they drink at all).  We next consider fluctuations in light and heavy
drinking vary by limiting the sample to alcohol users and analyzing dichotomous variables for
consumption of 1-10, 1-20, 21-59,  60 ≥ , and  100 ≥  drinks in the last 30 days.  The 60 and 100
(10 and 20) drink cutoffs represent alternative measures of heavy (light) drinking.  Although 60
drinks per month (which is frequently used to delineate “chronic” drinking), corresponds to an
average of only two alcoholic beverages per day, only 8 percent of consumers (4 percent of all
adults) report drinking this much.  Similarly fewer than 3 percent of imbibers claim to have
consumed 100 or more drinks.  Thus, these indicators capture the upper tail of the distribution of
alcohol use.  A final binary outcome, binge drinking, indicates the consumption of 5 or more
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alcoholic beverages on a single occasion.  Binge drinking could occur without heavy alcohol use
over the course of a month, although this is uncommon in our data.
36
The econometric results, displayed in Table 4, demonstrate that alcohol use falls in bad
economic times because of reductions in heavy drinking.  A one percentage point increase in
unemployment decreases the expected probability of consuming 60 (100) or more drinks by 0.63
(0.28) percentage points or 7.8 (9.7) percent.  Small declines in moderate consumption and binge
drinking are also observed but there is a statistically significant 2.0 (1.3)  percent rise in the
likelihood of imbibing 10 (20) or fewer drinks.  Once again a portion of the macroeconomic
fluctuation is due to changes in incomes; a $1000 reduction is predicted to decrease the
probability of consuming 60 (100) or more alcoholic beverages by 6.8 (1.7) percent and to cut
binge drinking by 4.7 percent, while raising the frequency of light drinking.
These estimates, combined with those in the previous section, indicate that alcohol use
falls during contractions because some drinkers switch from heavy to more moderate levels of
consumption, rather than because recreational users give up liquor or reduce their intake.  Since
heavy drinking is associated with alcohol abuse and light consumption may have medical
benefits, it is almost certain that drinking problems become less common in bad times.
37
5.  Dynamics
Economic conditions have been assumed to have only a contemporaneous impact on
alcohol use until now.  Information on the dynamics of the adjustment process is provided in
Table 5.  Models that include eighteen month lags of the state unemployment rate were estimated
and the predicted impact of a one percentage point rise in joblessness that has been sustained for
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k months calculated as  , ˆ k
0 n n t ∑ = − β  for  n t ˆ
− β the regression coefficient on the n-month lag of
unemployment.  Figure 2 provides additional detail on the adjustment paths, with solid lines
indicating predicted effects and dotted lines the 95 percent confidence intervals.  Here, and
throughout the remainder of the analysis, heavy alcohol use refers to conditional drinking of 100
or more alcoholic beverages in the prior month.
The adjustment patterns exhibit some instability over time, leading to imprecise
estimates.  Two patterns nevertheless emerge.  First, a sustained rise in joblessness is associated
with a short-lasting reduction in drinking participation.  Thus, a persistent one point increase in
unemployment is predicted to reduce drinking participation by 1.3, 1.3, 0.9, and 0.5 percentage
points (2.6, 2.6, 1.8, 0.9 percent) after 0, 3, 6, and 9 months but is associated with very small and
statistically insignificant changes beyond one year.
38  The decline in alcohol-involved driving
also appears to be temporary, with negative impacts expected in most of the first nine months but
essentially no effect thereafter.  Second, there are long-lasting changes in alcohol use at the
intensive margin.  For instance, conditional drinking is predicted to fall 3.4, 3.7, 6.0, and 5.0
percent after 0, 3, 9, and 15 months, and heavy consumption (100 or more drinks) by 0.4, 0.4,
0.6, and 0.4 percentage points (14.1, 12.8, 21.7, 14.1 percent).  It is noteworthy that we uncover
no evidence of larger permanent than transitory effects, as predicted by Becker and Murphy’s
(1988) theory of rational addiction.
6.   Population Subgroups
We next test for differences across population subgroups.  Males drink much more than
females.  As shown in Table 6, they are almost 40 percent more likely to have consumed alcohol
in the past month and have engaged in alcohol-involved driving 3.6 times as frequently.
Conditional on use, they consume twice as much alcohol, are 5.6 times as likely to have imbibed
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100 or more beverages, and binge drink 2.3 times as often.  Drinking also declines with age and
non-Hispanic minorities consume less alcohol than whites.  These patterns are consistent with
those found in other research (e.g. see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1997).
Table 7 summarizes the econometric results for subsamples stratified by sex, age, and
race/ethnicity.  A strong procyclical variation in conditional drinking and heavy consumption is
observed for most groups, with weaker impacts for drinking participation and alcohol-involved
driving.  One exception is that non-whites and senior citizens are more likely than others to stop
drinking altogether during economic downturns.  The large cyclical variation in alcohol use by
Hispanics is also noteworthy.  A one point rise in unemployment is predicted to reduce their
conditional drinking by 5.8 percent and alcohol-involved driving or heavy drinking by more than
15 percent.  The specific employment patterns of Hispanics (e.g. their high representation in
agricultural jobs) could play a role, as could cultural considerations.
39
The adjustment to sustained changes in economic conditions was examined using the
same procedures as above.  The results, briefly summarized in Appendix Table A.2, indicate
similar time profiles whereby a sustained rise in joblessness leads to temporary reductions in
expected drinking participation and alcohol-involved driving but longer-lasting decreases in
conditional drinking and heavy alcohol consumption.  There is, however, substantial variation in
the magnitudes of the estimated effects across population subgroups.
7.  Recession-Induced Unemployment
A decline in overall drinking during bad times could mask increased consumption among
persons entering unemployment.  We investigate this possibility using the augmented regression
model:
(5) Yijmt = αj + Xijmtβ + Emjtγ + δm + αj*T + Uijmtφ + UijmtEmjtλ + εijt,
                                                
3 39 9   F Fo or r   e ex xa am mp pl le e, ,   p pr re ev vi io ou us s   r re es se ea ar rc ch h   s su ug gg ge es st ts s   t th ha at t   H Hi is sp pa an ni ic cs s   o of ft te en n   c co on ns su um me e   a al lc co oh ho ol l   a as s   a a   r re ew wa ar rd d   f fo or r   h ha ar rd d   w wo or rk k   ( (H He ea at th h, ,
1 19 99 95 5; ;   A Am me es s   a an nd d   R Re eb bh hu un n, ,   1 19 99 96 6) )Page 17
where E now represents the deviation of the state unemployment rate from the sample mean and
U is a dummy variable set to one for respondents reporting their labor force status as “out of
work for less than 1 year.”
40  Persons “employed for wages” or “self-employed” are the reference
group and exposition of the results is simplified by excluding nonparticipants, defined as those
whose status is “homemaker”, “student”, “retired”, “unable to work”, or “out of work for more
than 1 year.”
41  We further restrict the analysis to 25 to 55 year olds (who are of prime working
age) and pay special attention to males, since nonparticipation is rare for men of this age.
Subject to a caveat discussed below, γ ˆ  measures the impact of macroeconomic
conditions on employed persons, φ ˆ  indicates the average difference in drinking between jobless
individuals and workers, and λ ˆ  (the coefficient of primary interest) shows how this disparity
fluctuates with economic conditions.  Specifically, if economic downturns lead to higher alcohol
consumption by the newly unemployed, despite an overall reduction in use, λ ˆ  will be positive
and larger in magnitude than the negative value of γ ˆ .
There is no evidence of increased drinking among persons becoming jobless during bad
times.  Column (a) of Table 8 shows results for the model estimated previously (equation 4),
while specification (b) provides the augmented regression estimates (equation 5).  The
interaction coefficient is almost always negative, suggesting larger procyclical variations in
alcohol use for recently unemployed individuals than for workers.  A one percentage point
increase in state unemployment is predicted to reduce the conditional drinking of employed 25-
55 year old males by 3.9 percent, compared to an almost 6 percent decrease for those out of work
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less than a year.
42  Similarly, a 0.4 percentage point decline in heavy drinking is anticipated for
the former group versus a 1.4 point drop among the latter.  Negative interaction terms are also
generally obtained for females, although the magnitudes are smaller.  This is expected since
women drink less (than men) and the distinction between nonparticipation and unemployment is
sometimes more ambiguous for them.
An alternative explanation of these findings deserves mention.  Positive values of φ ˆ
imply that persons out of work less than a year typically consume more alcohol than their
employed counterparts.
43   This is expected if heavy alcohol use makes it harder to find or hold
jobs.  If the distribution of joblessness becomes more random when the economy deteriorates
(e.g. as firms engage in non-selective mass layoffs), negative interaction coefficients might then
reflect positive selection into unemployment during bad times, rather than a causal impact of  the
macroeconomy.  Without longitudinal data, it is difficult to separate such compositional effects
from changes in behavior and our results must be interpreted with caution.  Notwithstanding this,
we uncover no evidence that loss of employment during bad times is associated with increased
drinking.  Instead, the data suggest relatively large declines for this group.
8.  Conclusion
This investigation uses microdata to confirm that drinking decreases in bad economic
times and expands on previous analyses by providing four new findings.  First, almost all of the
procyclical variation is due to changes in the consumption of existing drinkers with, at most,
short-lasting movements into or out of alcohol use.  Second, the decrease in consumption during
downturns is concentrated among heavy rather than recreational drinkers.  Since heavy use is
associated with alcohol problems and light drinking may yield health benefits, these results
provide strong evidence that alcohol abuse is procyclical.  Third, the macroeconomic responses
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tend to be relatively similar across demographic categories but with relatively large cyclical
fluctuations observed for groups with high average levels of drinking and Hispanics.  Fourth,
there is suggestive (but not conclusive) evidence that recent job losers, as well as those
remaining employed, cut their consumption when the economy deteriorates.
The results have important implications.  While we can not rule out the possibility that
the stress of a deteriorating economy causes some individuals to self-medicate by increasing
alcohol use, any such effect is more than offset by broader reductions in overall drinking.  One
reason for the fall in consumption is that incomes decline and alcohol is a normal good.  It is
therefore not surprising that the decrease is concentrated among heavy drinkers, who spend the
most on liquor.  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that this apparently dominates any resistance to
decreasing consumption due to the potentially addictive nature of substantial alcohol use.
The failure to adequately account for the macroeconomic environment could also result
in biased estimates of the social costs of alcohol problems calculated using data from a single
point in time.  For instance, one frequently cited study concludes that alcohol abuse cost the U.S.
$148 billion in 1992 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1998).  However, given
the weak economy in that year (e.g. the unemployment rate was 7.5 percent), these figures may
understate the expenses in more robust periods, such as the middle and late 1990s.
44
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Table 1:
Sample Means for Variables Used in Analysis
Variable Unweighted Mean Weighted Mean
Alcohol Use in Last Month
   Drinker (any use) .496 .521
   # Drinks (top-coded at 450) 19.7 21.4
   Alcohol-Involved Driving .024 .027
Age (years) 46.1 44.1
Female .582 .520
Employed (at survey date) .619 .626
Race/Ethnicity
   Black .085 .096
   Other Nonwhite .052 .058
   Hispanic Origin .053 .089
   Race Not Reported .003 .002
   Hispanic Origin Not Reported .003 .003
Education
   High School Dropout .148 .154
   Some College .256 .254
   College Graduate .262 .256
   Education Not Reported .002 .002
Current Marital Status
   Married/Cohabiting .572 .628
   Divorced/Separated .146 .106
   Widowed .110 .074
   Marital Status Not Reported .002 .001
State-Level Variables
   Survey Month Unemployment Rate (%) 5.42 5.85
   Personal Income (thousands of $1999) 24.9 25.6
   Beer Tax per Case ($1999) 1.92 1.85
Note:  Data are from the 1987-1999 years of the BRFSS, with additional information on state
economic conditions and beer taxes merged in from other sources.  The table shows mean values
of variables used in the econometric analysis.  The first column shows unweighted averages; the
second column weights the observations using BRFSS final sampling weights.Page 25
Table 2:  Predicted Effect of A One Percentage Point Increase in the State Unemployment Rate on Alcohol Use and Problems



































Type of Data Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Aggregate
State-Specific Time-Trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No Yes No No
Sampling Weights No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation Technique OLS OLS WLS WLS Probit WLS
Note:  Table shows predicted effects of a one percentage point increase in the state unemployment rate, using data from the 1987-1999
BRFSS. The first five columns show results using individual-level data.  Robust standard errors, calculated assuming that observations are
independent across months and states but not within states in a given month, are reported in parentheses.  These specifications include
month and state dummy variables and control for beer taxes, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, interactions between age, sex,
and race/ethnicity.  Columns (b) through (e) also contain state-specific linear time trends and specification (d) includes year dummy
variables.  “Drinking” refers to a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent had at least one drink in the last month.  The
“number of drinks” refers to the quantity of drinks in the last month for those with some consumption.  Alcohol-involved driving is a binary
variable set to one if the respondent reported driving at least once during the last month when he/she “had perhaps to much to drink”.
Sample sizes are 1,032,965, 490,653, and 1,030,174 for the three outcomes.  Appendix Table A.1 presents additional coefficient estimates
for specification (a).  Predicted effects are equal to the unemployment rate coefficients for the OLS and WLS estimates.  For the probit
models they are calculated as the marginal effects with the independent variables, other than the unemployment rate, evaluated at the sample
means.  Column (f) shows the results of models estimated by regressing state level aggregates on the state unemployment rate, beer tax,
state dummy variables, and state-specific time trends.  These data are obtained by taking (weighted) averages for each state-year cell in the
BRFSS sample.  These regressions are estimated using the square root of the adult state population (aged 18 and over) to weight the data.Page 26
Table 3:
Additional Estimates of the Effects of Changes
in Macroeconomic Conditions on Alcohol Use and Drinking Problems
Regressor (a) (b) (c)
Drinker






National Unemployment Rate -.0163
(.0025)
Per Capita Personal Income ($1000) -.0012
(.0023)
Log of Number of Drinks






National Unemployment Rate -.0664
(.0095)
Per Capita Personal Income ($1000) .0537
(.0080)
Alcohol-Involved Driving






National Unemployment Rate -.0015
(.0007)
Per Capita Personal Income ($1000) .0012
(.0006)
Note:  See note on Table 2.  The regressions also control for personal characteristics and beer
taxes, month and state dummy variables, state-specific linear time trends, and are estimated by
weighted least squares, using BRFSS final sampling weights.  Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.Page 27
Table 4:
Econometric Estimates of Categorical Amounts of Drinking For Persons Consuming Some Alcohol During the Last Month
# Drinks in Last Month
Regressor
1 - 10 1 - 20 21 - 59 ≥60 ≥100 ≥5 Drinks on
One Occasion
Sample Mean .518 .694 .225 .081 .029 .286






































Note: See note on Table 2.  All of the dependent variables are dichotomous outcomes indicating whether the respondents consume the specified
amounts of alcohol.  The sample is restricted to persons with some drinking during the last month.  The upper panel shows the weighted mean
for each dependent variable.  The middle and lower panels show regression results for models which also control for personal characteristics
and beer taxes, month and state dummy variables, and state-specific linear time trends.  The regressions are estimated by weighted least
squares, using BRFSS final sampling weights.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.Page 28
Table 5:
Predicted Effect of a Sustained One Percentage Point Increase in the
State Unemployment Rate on Alcohol Use and Drinking Problems



































































Note:  See note on Table 2.  This table shows the predicted effect of a one percentage point
increase in the state unemployment rate which is sustained for the number of months shown in
the first column of the table.  These predictions are made using models that correspond to
column (c) of Table 2, except that they also include lagged unemployment rates for the first
through eighteenth month prior to the survey date.  The effect of a rise in the unemployment rate
lasting for k months is calculated as  , ˆ k
0 n n t ∑ = − β  for   n t ˆ
− β  the regression coefficient on the n-
month lag of the state unemployment rate.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Heavy drinking is defined as the consumption of 100 or more drinks in the last month, for
respondents with some alcohol use.Page 29
Table 6:












Full Sample .521 21.4 .027 .028 .285 1,032,965
Sex
   Male .608 28.0 .043 .045 .378 431,902
   Female .440 13.0 .012 .008 .166 601,063
Race/Ethnicity
   White (Not Hispanic) .541 21.5 .028 .028 .282 855,506
   Black (Not Hispanic) .402 19.8 .016 .028 .246 85,033
   Other (Not Hispanic) .453 19.0 .020 .029 .256 37,985
   Hispanic .496 22.5 .031 .035 .352 54,441
Age (in years)
   18 to 24 .589 26.2 .054 .044 .481 101,363
   25 to 64 .550 20.5 .027 .026 .272 731,096
   ≥65 .344 20.4 .003 .023 .085 200,506
Note:  Observations are weighted using BRFSS final sampling weights.  The number of drinks
and the probability of heavy or binge drinking are calculated for persons with some alcohol use
during the month.  Heavy drinking is defined as the consumption of 100 or more alcoholic
beverages.Page 30
Table 7:
Predicted Effect of a One Percentage Point Increase in the State Unemployment





























































































Note:  See notes on Tables 2 and 5.  The regressions control for personal characteristics and beer
taxes, month and state dummy variables, and state-specific linear time trends.  They are
estimated by WLS using BRFSS final sampling weights.  Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses.Page 31
Table 8:







(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Males





































































Note:  See notes on Tables 2 and 6.   The sample is restricted to 25-55 year olds reporting being employed or out of work less than one year at the
survey date.  The state unemployment rate represents the deviation from the sample mean.  The regressions also control for personal
characteristics and beer taxes, month and state dummy variables, state-specific linear time trends, and are estimated by WLS using BRFSS final
sampling weights.  The reference group includes persons working at the survey date.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The
sample size for drinking participation is 252,393 for males and 267,322 for females.Page 32
Table A.1:  Detailed Regression Results for Selected Specifications
Regressor Drinker






























































































































































Note:  See note on table 2.  The econometric models include state and month dummy variables, as well as the regressors
displayed, and correspond to those in column (a) of Table 2.Page 34
Table A.2:
Predicted Effect of a Sustained One Percentage Point Increase in the State
Unemployment Rate For Population Subgroups
Non-Hispanic Months Since Rise





































































































































































































Note:  See notes on Tables 2, 5, and 7.Page 35
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